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Abstract 
This paper contributes to comparative environmental politics by integrating 
comparative analysis with debates about ontological politics and Science and 
Technology Studies (STS). Comparative environmental analysis makes two tacit 
assumptions: that the subject of comparison (e.g. an environmental policy framework) is 
mobile and can be detached from its contexts; and that studying this subject in more 
than one location can identify its diffusion and implementation anywhere. These 
assumptions are sites of ontological politics by predetermining (or restricting) 
environmental outcomes. Environmental analysis needs to consider how far its own 
comparative acts might reify supposedly global frameworks rather than acknowledge 
how different localities appropriate and give meaning to them in diverse ways. The 
concept of civic epistemologies illustrates how domestic politics are organized around 
supposedly global concepts, rather than how global concepts diffuse around the world, 
as illustrated here by a comparative analysis of the United Nations’ Green Economy 
Initiative. 
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Introduction 
 
There’s an old story about two monks watching a flag blowing in the breeze. The first 
monk says: “the flag is moving.” The second replies: “the wind is moving.” A passing 
abbot intervenes: “it is not the flag, nor the wind, but your mind that moves.” 
 
Comparative environmental analysis can be somewhat like the monks’ story. In order 
for comparison to identify similar or different outcomes of an environmental policy 
framework, it must distinguish between flags and wind through a multi-step 
methodology. First, it needs to identify a subject that can be analyzed at a distance. 
Second, the subject has to be geopolitically mobile, i.e. having various states of existence 
in different locations. And third, the subject has to be separable from (or independent 
of) local contexts in order to reveal relationships between the global subject and 
different contexts where it occurs. Comparative environmental analysis therefore 
depends on dual assumptions about i) mobility, the extent to which the subject can be 
detached from and circulate between contexts, and ii) representation, the ability to 
know when the subject exists, separately from its context. 
 
Here we argue that these implicit assumptions warrant critical scrutiny because 
comparative environmental analysis often confuses flags and wind. In other words, 
comparisons often look for the existence of specific, pre-defined environmental subjects 
in different locations, while missing how local contexts define and drive diverse 
pathways to widely varying outcomes. These local outcomes can be very different from 
the supposedly global subject under comparison, but still used to demonstrate the 
mobility of that subject. Comparative environmental analysis needs clarity about what is 
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being compared; how and by whom this is identified; and how some comparative 
approaches may hide these questions.  Such scrutiny and clarity are necessary for 
extending the past insights of comparative analysis within political science within global 
environmental politics. 
 
In order to discuss this dilemma, we draw upon the growing debates about ontological 
politics, and apply this to the United Nations’ Green Economy Initiative. Ontological 
politics have been defined as “conflicts involving different assumptions about ‘what 
exists’”1 and has been discussed within social science in recent years, largely 
complementing debates within Science and Technology Studies (STS).  As we will show 
here, ontological politics is useful for comparative environmental analysis by drawing 
attention to the implicit politics by which comparative analysis defines its subject, or 
marshals evidence for subjects. We consider this theme by asking how far comparative 
environmental analysis might—in effect—reify concepts that appear to be global, but 
where sufficient differences exist in different localities to question whether the concepts 
can be called global. Using the analogy of the monks’ story, various studies point to the 
growth of the Green Economy Initiative in different countries, but perhaps this is seeing 
the flag of the United Nations Environment Programme flying around the world, rather 
than local winds, or the mindsets that emphasize flags over wind.  
 
In order to overcome these challenges, we draw from debates within STS about how 
concepts circulate between contexts. In particular, we argue that one common means of 
analyzing circulation—Actor Network Theory (ANT)—needs to be tempered by an 
analysis of how localities appropriate and give meaning to global frameworks rather 
than simply adopt frameworks as though they are mobile and detached from contexts. 
To fill this gap, we use the alternative concepts of co-production and civic 
                                                        
1 Blaser 2013, 547. 
 3 
epistemologies to demonstrate the culturally specific ways of knowing through which 
localities or contexts identify their own paths to environmental outcomes, rather than 
adopt a freely circulating concept that is often the subject of comparative environmental 
politics.2 Instead, our paper shows aims to show how comparison itself, without due 
consideration, can reify the appearance of mobility, and reduce attention to different 
(and possibly more important) local responses and meanings given to environmental 
policy. 
 
 
The allure of comparative environmental analysis 
 
As a field, global environmental politics commonly focuses on how environmental 
regimes form, and accordingly on the relative progress of different nation states or 
territories in adopting environmental policies. Mark Purdon notes that comparative 
environmental analysis can help “open the black box” of domestic politics in order to 
understand different drivers of national governments’ willingness to participate or not 
in global policy.3 He notes that the comparative method is one of the basic scientific 
methods “of discovering empirical relationships among variables” in order to establish 
“general propositions.”4 
 
Comparative environmental analysis can also indicate the diversity of responses to 
global environmental challenges. Steinberg and VanDeveer, for example, note: 
Systematic comparisons of domestic environmental politics allow us to move 
beyond ill-defined exhortations to “save the planet” toward a greater 
                                                        
2 Jasanoff 2005, 255; Miller 2008.; also see Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 4. 
3 Purdon 2015, citing Victor 2011, 8. 
4 Purdon 2015, citing Lijphart 1971, 682-683. 
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understanding of the vast array of social responses to environmental problems 
in diverse countries around the globe.5 
 
Indeed, the same authors later state that comparative environmental analysis helps to 
“gain insights into the cause-and-effect relationships that lead states and social actors to 
practice or ignore environmental stewardship.”6  But what is assumed about the latter 
concept?  
 
Another well-cited example of cross-national comparison of environmental values by 
Dunlap and York7 sought to analyze how different countries were adopting post-
materialist values in order to indicate progress towards environmental policy. The 
research asked respondents questions such as whether they approved of ecological or 
nature movements; plus other inquiries such as whether they would pay more tax to 
prevent environmental damage—or if they believed protecting the environment should 
prioritized higher than economic growth. The authors concluded about developing 
countries: 
environmental activism in these countries is often reflective of 
widespread public sentiment. Clearly, both environmental activism and 
public support for environmental protection have become global 
phenomena and are no longer—if they ever were—limited to the wealthy 
nations of the world.8 
 
Yet, despite the scholarship of these studies, they beg important questions. The above 
studies do not explore who defines or legitimizes visions of “environmental 
stewardship.” Similarly, by asking simply about public support for “ecological values,” 
                                                        
5 Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 29. 
6 Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 29. 
7 Dunlap and York 2008, 2012. 
8 Dunlap and York 2012, 108. 
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the question neglects how these may have various forms within and/or across contexts; 
likewise for various forms of “economic growth.” As in this study by Dunlap and York, 
comparative analysis has been used to illustrate and explain the dissemination of 
environmental values as “global phenomena.” But the various ways in which values can 
be defined—and the diversity of pathways to achieve them—seem to be hidden 
unwittingly in the overall objective to demonstrate optimism about environmental 
values spreading around the world. 
 
 
Ontology and globalizing assumptions 
 
Our critical questions above raise concerns about the ontological politics at play by 
referring to conflicts about how “environment” or “ecological values” are defined by 
actors, generally in tacit ways.  Comparative environmental analysis often keeps the 
differences tacit, through ontological assumptions about a geopolitically mobile subject 
(as above) and/or through insufficient attention to its diverse forms, when representing 
environmental outcomes in different contexts around the world.  
 
In turn, these challenges also demonstrate what STS debates have called co-production, 
i.e. knowledge-generation occurring simultaneously with visions of social order (and 
vice versa).9 Co-production can demonstrate how social values influence what is 
identified and measured as appropriate (environmental) performance. It can also be 
used to analyze how frameworks of environmental analysis can separate those 
outcomes from local contexts. 
 
                                                        
9 Jasanoff 2004. 
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One early analysis of co-production within global environmental politics focused on the 
assumptions underlying the 1972 Limits To Growth report. It had ominously predicted, 
“Short of a world effort… the outcome can only be disaster.”10 But according to the co-
productionist analysis, this outcome could only be projected by assuming that citizens 
around the world adopt a “rational choice” response to resource scarcity, such as by 
competing for resources or failing to adopt means of mitigating consumption. 
Accordingly, the authors argued that the Limits To Growth model could only co-exist 
with a parallel (but implicit) model of individual behavior—which was not justified by 
research on social behavior in different locations.11  
 
Another early co-productionist analysis was Agarwal and Narain’s famous criticism of 
the World Resources Institute assertion that China, India, and Brazil were among the top 
six countries responsible for anthropogenic climate change on the grounds of current 
rates of fossil-fuel use and deforestation.12 Agarwal and Narain argued instead there was 
a need to consider other aspects: per capita energy use; historic deforestation; and 
whether fuels were used for livelihoods or high-consuming lifestyles. This study 
demonstrated the principle of co-production because it showed how supposedly neutral 
cross-national comparisons of global climate-change policy also carried parallel (and 
implicit) normative assumptions about appropriate origins of emissions, assumptions 
which—allegedly—overlooked international inequalities in development. 
 
STS approaches to cross-national environmental comparisons aim to identify the 
implicit social norms that—in turn—shape measurements of how different countries 
adhere (or not) to standards of environmental performance. So, for example, when Keck 
and Sikkink claimed that international advocacy coalitions among environmental NGOs 
                                                        
10 Meadows et al 1972, 195. 
11 Taylor and Buttell 1992. 
12 Agarwal and Narain 1991, criticizing WRI 1990. 
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and campaigners in different countries allow “ecological values to be placed above 
narrow definitions of national interest,”13 this statement gives insufficient attention to 
what “ecological values” mean, and how far they are indeed internationally accepted. 
Similarly, the aforementioned questions posed by Dunlap and York imply a necessary 
choice between economic growth and ecological values, thus making ontological 
assumptions about what both concepts mean. This framework pre-empts the possibility 
of actors reframing the concepts as compatible. 
 
 
Comparison and diversity 
 
Through such blindspots, comparative environmental analysis might contribute to a 
normative form of cultural globalization if it seeks to analyze by comparing national 
adoption of environmental values that are predefined in culturally specific ways, or 
without sufficient awareness of what alternative values are being excluded. To avoid 
this blindspot, comparative methods need to become more aware of the underlying 
models of mobility and representation of environmental outcomes. But how to achieve 
this awareness? 
 
Within STS, actor-network theory has been used as a framework to consider how 
concepts or “facts” circulate between contexts when the conditions that first identified 
these items are recreated at different sites. Bruno Latour,14 for example, argued that 
Pasteur’s scientific experiments on anthrax changed practices across France on the tacit 
assumption that progress could be made only when the same laboratory-type 
conditions were replicated in distant places in the field. From this framework arose the 
concept of “immutable mobile,” i.e. an object that remains stable between contexts 
                                                        
13 Keck and Sikkink 1999, 215. 
14 Latour 1987. 
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because the social conditions that uphold them are replicated in each location.15 In this 
sense, uncritical approaches to comparative environmental analysis implicitly look for 
actor networks that can enhance the circulation of immutable mobiles in different 
contexts; evidence for them is equated with global diffusion. 
 
But the actor–network framework also contains tensions and different approaches that 
challenge the earlier focus on immutable mobiles. One famous analysis of international 
comparisons of anemia showed that different countries and organizations defined and 
measured anemia very differently. Accordingly, the international “comparison” was 
made coherent only because scientists labeled these diverse measurements under the 
single category of “anemia.”16  By analogy, “global environmentalism” might therefore 
disseminate in similar ways if diverse national pathways are labeled loosely as 
representing the same transition, thus reinforcing academics’ ontological assumptions. 
 
Moreover, actor-network theory has been criticized for prioritizing the analysis of 
circulation, while neglecting how localities make and achieve their own environmental 
outcomes, which might or might not be identified and compared between contexts. 
According to Sheila Jasanoff: 
when actor-network theory confronts the nature of power, as if often 
does, it side-steps the very questions about people, institutions, ideas and 
preferences that are of greatest political concern. Who loses and who 
wins through the constitution of networks? How are benefits and burdens 
(re)distributed by or across them? How willing or unwilling are 
participants to change their behavior or beliefs because of their 
enrollment into networks?17 
                                                        
15 Latour 1986, 12. 
16 Mol and Law 1994; Law 2011. 
17 Jasanoff 2004, 23. 
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Pursuing the above questions, STS has elaborated the concept of civic epistemologies, 
i.e. how localities identify and legitimize norms of behavior, as well as making them 
visible within global initiatives.18 Civic epistemologies have been defined as the 
“national cultures of rationality.”19 They offer a means of identifying local influences on 
environmental values or different pathways for adopting global policies.   
 
Its relevance to comparative environmental analysis goes beyond merely cognitive 
aspects.  As Steinberg and VanDeveer note: “[national] variance [in environmental 
performance] is due in part to differences in the way that science is organized in distinct 
national settings.”20 But civic epistemologies emphasize the extra-cognitive, normative 
shaping of environmental responses, beyond simply adherence to internationally 
defined standards. Crucially, civic epistemologies are also defined as “the dimensions of 
political order that each state seeks to immunize or hold beyond question”21 and the 
ways by which “the commingling of is and ought takes place.”22 Consequently, civic 
epistemologies offer insights to the variety by which different locations interpret and 
respond to environmental policies, rather than adopt pre-defined environmental values 
and outcomes. These locations can be national or sub-national contexts, but also any 
scale where knowledge claims are made and contested in coherent terms. 
 
 
Example: The Green Economy 
 
The United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) defines a green economy as:  
                                                        
18 Daston 2000; Barry 2012. 
19 Winickoff 2012, x. 
20 Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 4. 
21 Jasanoff 2012, 10. 
22 Jasanoff 2012, 19. (Emphasis in original). 
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One that results in improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its 
simplest expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which 
is low carbon resource efficient and socially inclusive.23 
 
The Green Economy Initiative (GEI) was launched by UNEP in 2008 as a means of 
integrating economic development with sustainable development. It was based on the 
achievement of three key objectives: a new economic management to avoid the 
misallocation of resources; an acknowledgement of how population growth and 
consumption threaten scarce resources; and a commitment to assist poorer and more 
vulnerable people, such as in developing countries. UNEP also identified five key 
enabling conditions for establishing a Green Economy:24 to work against the implicit 
subsidies of underpriced resources (such as air and water as sinks for uncosted 
pollution); appropriate pricing for resources and all other inputs in an economy in order 
to avoid underpricing resources; encouraging investment in resource-efficient research 
and development; higher levels of efficiency; and environmental regulation to pre-empt 
resource scarcities, and to redirect economies away from unsustainable activities. 
 
Various non-governmental organizations and academics have criticized the GEI, 
however, on the grounds that it does not adequately transform current economic 
practices, leaves intact the “brown economy” or even extends neoliberal globalization. 
For example, within the GEI framework, the Natural Capital Declaration of Chief 
Executive Officers from financial companies undertook to incorporate natural capital 
into their balance sheets.25 A network of civil society organizations, however, stated the 
Declaration “is based upon a fatally flawed understanding of the root causes of crises 
                                                        
23 http://www.unep.org/greeneconomy/AboutGEI/WhatisGEI/tabid/29784/Default.aspx 
24 UNEP 2011, 22-23. 
25 BankTrack 2012; IISD 2012, 8. 
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(imperfect valuation of ‘Natural Capital and Ecosystem Services’) and proposes an 
equally flawed solution to them (proper pricing).”26 
 
The GEI has also generated different international comparisons that illustrate the 
implicit political challenges of comparative environmental analysis. For example, a new 
global network of researchers and practitioners recently published the Green Growth in 
Practice: Lessons from Country Experiences, which drew lessons from nine countries 
including Morocco, Kenya, Bangladesh, South Korea, Singapore, Brazil, Mexico, Costa 
Rica, and the USA.27 Although the report refers to “green growth,” the links with the GEI 
are clear:  “Green growth is becoming an attractive opportunity for countries around the 
world to achieve poverty reduction, environmental protection, resource efficiency and 
economic growth in an integrated way.”28 
 
Although implying various national means towards the same objective, the report 
indicates the diversity of pathways adopted.29 For example, “China has committed to 
green growth in its 12th Five Year Plan. Actions include investing in natural resource 
management, with the aim of creating one million new forestry jobs and reducing rural 
poverty.” By contrast, “Korea has adopted a green growth strategy to drive economic 
competitiveness through development and use of advanced technologies. The 
government is investing in innovation and deployment programs for 27 priority 
technologies guided by a Green Technology Roadmap with the goal of becoming the 
world’s 7th largest economy by 2020.” Meanwhile, in Japan, the government has created 
a Comprehensive Strategy focused on four areas: Green, Life, Agriculture, and Small and 
Medium Enterprises. Japan thereby aims to “construct a resilient and adaptable 
socioeconomy and demonstrate model solutions to the world by addressing energy 
                                                        
26 BankTrack 2012. See also: Bina 2013; Brand 2012ab; Fuentes-George 2013. Mirowski 2013. 
27 GGBP 2014. 
28 GGBP 2014. 
29 All citations are from GGBP 2014, 13-23. 
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constraints and an aging society; and build local communities driven by individuals and 
entrepreneurs supported by local agriculture to reap the benefits of a new kind of 
growth.” 
 
A comparative analysis requires some difficult questions: How (much) do any of these 
objectives demonstrate a distinctive shift from pre-existing national technological and 
social policies in these countries? Is all this a gradual diffusion of the GEI to different 
countries around the world? Or is this an optical illusion, based on how governments 
and expert agencies write reports about the green economy?  As in the monks’ story, it is 
important to consider the extent to which evidence depends on the eye of the beholder.  
 
In terms of evaluating evidence, consider this example: 
Ethiopia used a broad analytic framework for assessing green growth 
benefits. An Integrated Assessment Model was used for macro-economic 
impact such as the loss of GDP from climate change impacts in the 
agriculture and energy sectors. The benefits (and costs) of each option 
were assessed using multiple criteria that ranged from economic cost-
benefit ratios, to qualitative assessments of the benefits for biodiversity 
and poverty reduction. A relatively basic spreadsheet-based analysis was 
used to assess sector specific benefits.30 
 
Does this description suggest that evidence of green growth in Ethiopia was the work of 
an enterprising analyst in front of a computer, rather than transitions in economic 
investments and behavior? Also, some other examples of “national” progress seemed 
based on individual projects rather than new national policies. For example, the report 
cites the example of a World Bank funded watershed management project in Karnataka, 
                                                        
30 GGBP 2014, 19. 
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India, which “employed a systems approach, with a focus on soil and water conservation 
and sustainable resource use, and used participatory planning and implementation to 
improve local livelihoods, gender equity, and community capacity.”31  
 
Another study compared the GEI in Malawi, Mozambique, and South Africa. Echoing the 
concerns of Agarwal and Narain , this study argued that a literal adoption of the GEI 
would reduce the opportunities for these countries to gain economic competitive 
advantage—by restricting local development of fossil fuel deposits—but also “generate 
substantial domestic resistance, especially among the poor.”32 For example, in South 
Africa, coal supplied 81 percent of installed electricity capacity in 2011, but 94 percent 
of domestic demand in total because of the low load-bearing capacities of renewable 
energy.33 In Malawi, there was popular and government resistance to the GEI proposal 
to end subsidies on agriculture fertilizer because these were considered essential to 
local food security.34 
 
Meanwhile in Mozambique biofuel from the jatropha plant has been promoted as an 
opportunity to employ unskilled labor and reduce dependency on imported oil; but it 
might also increase deforestation because it requires a larger disturbance of currently 
unplanted land. By contrast, ethanol from sugar cane offers a higher production of 
energy but less scope for hiring unskilled labor. It is therefore unclear how green 
growth can achieve its combined objectives of alleviating poverty and reducing 
environmental degradation.35 Such choices are further complicated by plantation-scale 
biofuel development, which divert scarce water from food crops, as criticized by local 
                                                        
31 GGBP 2014, 27. 
32 Resnick et al 2012, 215.  
33 Resnick et al 2012, 219. 
34 Resnick et al 2012, 222. 
35 Resnick et al 2012, 216. 
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NGOs.36 
 
The above observations highlight how cross-national comparisons have asked mainly to 
what extent different countries have adopted the GEI as a central, allegedly transferable 
framework. But the analysis can be read instead as diverse pathways to different 
outcomes. (Indeed, it can also indicate local concerns about the GEI framework). Taking 
this comparative analysis at face value implies that the GEI is a globally mobile, 
comparable outcome—contrary to its great diversity. It also implies that progress can 
be identified by measuring its adoption, thus obscuring the normative criteria and 
accountabilities driving its local versions. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Comparative environmental analysis can be a powerful explanatory tool and in turn a 
political tool for pursuing better futures. But such analysis can be blind by conflating 
movement of a flag, of the wind and the mind of the beholder, as in the monks’ story.   
This paper has argued that comparative environmental analysis should consider how far 
the act of comparison itself can reify supposedly global concepts as mobile, transferable 
frameworks—rather than see how localities appropriate or give meanings to these and 
other environmental frameworks. Comparative environmental analysis therefore should 
not simply identify the different factors driving national or sub-national levels of 
participation in global environmental policies, but also ask how the act of comparison 
(and the selection of evidence to demonstrate differences) can reify or hide how 
different localities identify and respond to environmental initiatives.  
 
                                                        
36 Friends of the Earth International 2010.   
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Comparative environmental analysis can reify or hide diversity in environmental 
activities and perceptions through a tacit process of ontological politics. These politics 
exist in two tacit assumptions: that the subjects of comparison (such as an 
environmental policy framework) can be detached from their contexts; and that 
studying this subject in more than one location can identify its diffusion and 
implementation anywhere. These ontological assumptions predetermine (or restrict) 
the definition of appropriate environmental outcomes, thus missing how local contexts 
define and drive diverse pathways to widely varying outcomes. These local outcomes 
can be very different than the supposedly global subject under comparison, but the 
reasons why these local responses are different can be ignored if the objective of 
comparison is to demonstrate the mobility of the main subject of comparative analysis. 
While many proponents of comparative environmental politics have argued that this 
style of analysis aims precisely to identify local drivers for policy, this paper has listed 
examples of comparative analysis of environmental values and the Green Economy 
Initiative that have compressed local differences into alleged evidence for the mobility 
of concepts.37 This paper has identified such blindspots and proposed a framework for 
avoiding them, as a basis to realize the benefits of comparative environmental politics.  
 
As part of this framework, it is important to acknowledge that comparison itself 
contains various ontological politics. This is a slightly different understanding to 
Steinberg and VanDeveer, who have proposed that comparative environmental politics 
(or analysis) is a positive collaboration between “those concerned with the fate of the 
planet and its people and those engaged in the comparative study of political life.”38 In 
contrast to this statement, we argue that comparative environmental analysis (or 
comparative environmental politics) is not an allocation of labor between political 
scientists (who do the comparison) and environmentalists (who provide the concern 
                                                        
37 e.g. Dunlap and York 2008; GGBP 2014. 
38 Steinberg and VanDeveer 2012, 30. 
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about the planet). Rather, there is a need to see how knowledge, concern, and analysis 
are produced together. STS Scholars of Science and Technology Studies (STS) have 
labeled this association co-production—or the mutual creation of knowledge with 
visions of social order.39 Comparative analysis can inadvertently hide ontological 
differences in how localities conceptualize “the environment,” its protection, their own 
responsibilities, etc. As an example of such differences, the United Nations Green 
Economy Initiative has taken diverse national forms, but despite the claims of 
comparative analysis discussed in this paper, it remains unclear whether these 
countries adopted new global norms under the Green Economy banner, or are 
presenting pre-existing activities and policies in order to give that appearance. 
 
To overcome these challenges, we have proposed that comparative analysis needs to ask 
two additional questions: “What is” being compared? (Or, is the subject sufficiently 
mobile to be detachable from contexts?) And by assuming that something is mobile and 
comparable, are local contexts and their drivers being hidden? The civic epistemologies 
framework offers means to identify the local contexts, drivers and accountabilities 
whereby localities devise environmental norms. This framework also focuses more 
upon how environmental values and policies are contingently made, rather than simply 
circulate for adoption (or not).  In this sense, we have argued that the analysis of 
circulation under Actor Network Theory within STS needs to be complemented by 
reference to the concepts of co-production and civic epistemologies. Together, the 
analysis of how comparison contains tacit ontological assumptions; how localities 
appropriate global concepts; or how researchers or other reporters portray localities as 
adopting global concepts; represent tacit ontological politics that warrant further 
investigation within the emerging field of comparative environmental analysis. 
 
                                                        
39 Jasanoff, 2004. 
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